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Don't Abandon the Model Penal Code Yet!
Thinking Through Simons's Rethinking
Kimberly Kessler Ferzant
Cul*pa*ble: Responsible for wrong or error: blameworthy.'
Criminal law theorists argue that culpability is a
prerequisite for blameworthiness and responsibility. The
definition above renders our endeavor circular. What does
it mean to say someone is culpable?
For some time, we thought we knew the answer to this
question. Culpability was about choosing to commit a
wrong, and the nature of this choice determined the degree
of culpability.2 This is the view of the Model Penal Code.
Yet, as this Symposium reveals, our consensus has
devolved to dissensus. Criminal law theorists are now
challenging the conventional framework's ability to capture
culpability adequately. These theorists argue that our
current culpability theory pays insufficient attention to the
motives, emotions, and desires of the actor and that these
elements are a constitutive part of culpability.'
t Assistant Professor of Law, Rutgers University--School of Law, Camden.
For comments on drafts of this article, I thank Larry Alexander, Peter Arenella,
Roger Clark, Dennis Patterson, Stash Pomorski, Ken Simons, Rick Singer, and
the participants of the faculty workshops at Rutgers. Bevin Bermingham
provided valuable research assistance.
1. Webster's II, New Riverside University Dictionary (1988).
2. See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Shulhofer, Criminal Law and
Its Processes: Cases and Materials 203 (7th ed. 2001) ("essentially [mens real
refers to the blameworthiness in choosing to commit a criminal wrong").
3. Emotions, motives, and desires are distinguishable. Desires are mental
states that take intentional objects-I desire x. Motives are most generally
viewed as the ultimate purpose of an intentional action (I do X for Y). See Douglas
N. Husak, Motive and Criminal Liability, 8 Crim. J. Ethics 3, 5-6 (1989)
(discussing this account of motive). Although less relevant for our purposes, one
may also be motivated by something. See id. at 6 (discussing this alternative
account of motive). Finally, there are emotions-feelings that one has which are
typically accompanied by physiological reactions. Emotions arguably have
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In part, this battle over culpability is actually a proxy
for a different debate, the question of the proper
justifications for punishment. After all, if one adopts a
theory of deterrence, then culpability is geared toward how
deterrable the actor is. If one adopts a theory based on
virtue, one's theory of culpability will be directed at moral
failings.
Surprisingly, however, even within retributive theory,
there are new rumblings. Theorists are now arguing that
retributive desert is somehow linked to the emotions,
motives, and desires of the actor. One such theorist is Ken
Simons.' Simons presents a thorough and articulate
objection to the Model Penal Code's hierarchy, arguing that
the Model Penal Code fails to capture culpability
adequately because it confuses cognitive and conative
mental states.5 Simons contends that there are separate
cognitive and conative hierarchies that independently
speak to the culpability of the actor. Moreover, Simons
claims that the Model Penal Code is inadequate because it
largely ignores conative states, which are, in his view, more
closely linked with culpability.
In this Article, I contend that Simons's argument,
properly understood, does not challenge the Model Penal
Code's view of culpability. I begin by discussing the "old
culpability" theory, which links culpability to choice and
wrongdoing. I also show how the Model Penal Code
cognitive content. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions
of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 285-96 (1996) (discussing the
evaluative view of emotions). Clearly, these three may be related. I may hate X
(emotion); desire that X die (desire); and kill X because I want to see him suffer
(motive). These categories can be collapsed or manipulated. For instance, one
might create a crime that punishes an act done for the purpose of expressing or
gratifying a desire, thereby manipulating the distinction between a desire and a
motive.
4. Kenneth W. Simons, Rethinking Mental States, 72 B.U. L. Rev. 463 (1992)
[hereinafter Simons, Rethinking]; Kenneth W. Simons, Culpability and
Retributive Theory: The Problem of Criminal Negligence, 5 J. Contemp. Legal
Issues 365 (1994) [hereinafter Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory].
5. I employ Simons's terminology here. Conative states are desire states,
and cognitive states are belief states. See Simons, Culpability and Retributive
Theory, supra note 4, at 372.
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implicitly adopts this view. I next explore Ken Simons's
competing view of culpability. After discussing some
conceptual difficulties with Simons's new culpability
hierarchies, I turn to the focal point of Simons's work-
culpable indifference. I argue that Simons confuses two
different senses of indifference: indifference as desire state
and indifference as insufficient moral aversion. I contend
that Simons's challenge to the Model Penal Code
precariously rests upon this fracture in meaning. Indeed, I
uncover four distinct claims that Simons makes, using
different conceptions of indifference. I find that two of
these claims are morally objectionable and therefore not
viable challenges to the Model Penal Code, and two of these
claims illuminate, but do not undermine, the Code's
position.
I. CHOICE, CULPABILITY, AND WRONGDOING: THE IMPLICIT
ASSUMPTIONS OF THE MODEL PENAL CODE
The traditional dichotomy in criminal responsibility is
between wrongdoing and culpability. One is the bad act;
the other is the guilty mind. What makes an act wrongful
is subject to controversy, 6 as is whether wrongdoing has
any independent significance Our focus, however, is on
the other aspect of criminal blameworthiness-culpability.
Culpability appears to be the dominant force in criminal
6. Compare Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others 32-36 (1984) (equating "harms"
with "wrongs"), with Heidi M. Hurd, What in the World is Wrong?, 5 J. Contemp.
Legal Issues 157, 210-12 (1994) (arguing "wrongful actions are not conceptually
identical to actions that cause harm"). Because my argument does not turn on
this distinction, I use these two terms interchangeably.
7. Compare Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J. Contemp. Legal
Issues 1 (1994) (arguing attempts are as blameworthy as completed crimes); Joel
Feinberg, Equal Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but Instructive
Arguments Against It, 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 117 (1995); Sanford H. Kadish, The
Criminal Law and the Luck of the Draw, 84 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 679 (1994);
and Kimberly D. Kessler, Comment, The Role of Luck in the Criminal Law, 142
U. Pa. L. Rev. 2183 (1994), with George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law
472-83 (1978) (taking the opposing view); Leo Katz, Why the Successful Assassin
Is More Wicked than the Unsuccessful One, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 791 (2000); and
Michael S. Moore, The Independent Moral Significance of Wrongdoing, 5 J.
Contemp. Legal Issues 237 (1994).
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law.' We punish culpable actors who do no harm in the
case of attempts, but find it harder to stomach crimes of
strict liability where social harm has occurred but the actor
is not culpable.
Despite its primacy in the criminal law, the guilty
mind is not completely independent of the bad act. Rather,
the traditional view is that content of culpability is
dependent on what we determine to be wrong.9 An actor is
culpable because she is "thinking about" (however we
might wish to phrase her subjective state of mind) doing a
wrong. Thus, culpability turns on whether the actor
perceives her contemplated action to entail wrongful
conduct. This is not a character assessment of whether an
individual has bad thoughts, but rather an assessment of
the actor's choice.
Now, the actor's choice may involve different subjective
beliefs about the relationship between her act and a wrong.
First, the wrong may be her goal, e.g., Jane fires the gun at
George and kills him because she wants him dead.10 We
might further split this goal-oriented action into ultimate
purpose and mediate purpose. That is, Jane may want
George dead as an end in itself (ultimate purpose) or Jane
may want George dead as a means to some other end, such
8. "The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when inflicted
by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal and persistent
in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a consequent
ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil."
Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).
9. Hurd, supra note 6, at 194 n.48 ("one is culpable if (1) one subjectively
believes that one will act wrongly, or (2) one is epistemically situated so that on
the evidence reasonably available to one, one ought to believe that one will act
wrongly."); Michael S. Moore, Prima Facie Moral Culpability, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 319,
320 (1996) ("[Olne is prima facie culpable when one acts under a representation of
one's action that would make that action morally wrongful if the representation
were true."); id. at 321 ("[Clulpability is wrongdoing in the possible world created
by one's representational states.").
10. Accord Moore, supra note 9, at 322. But see Claire Finkelstein, The
Irrelevance of the Intended to Prima Facie Culpability: Comment on Moore, 76
B.U. L. Rev. 335, 337 (1996) ("This is arguably not a case in which killing is an
end in itself, because it is not the killing, but rather pleasure, that is the end.").
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as insurance money.11 Either way, Jane's actions are
directed toward committing the wrong.
12
On the other hand, Jane may not be aiming at a
wrong, but nevertheless, such a wrong may be a known
side effect of her action. 3 That is, Jane may be escaping
from prison and plant a bomb to blow up the prison walls.
If she knows that George is on the other side of the wall
and will be killed when the wall explodes, she is aware of
this side effect, but it is not her reason for acting.
Additionally, Jane's belief may be further qualified as to
her degree of certainty that George's death will result.
4
Finally, an actor may be unaware that a wrong will
occur as a result of her actions. For example, Jane may
unreasonably fail to realize that she is running a red light
and that she is creating the risk of killing George. When
even a reasonable person would fail to acquire the belief or
to make the judgment that she is risking a wrong, the actor
will not be criminally responsible unless the crime is strict
liability.
The Model Penal Code's mental states parallel the
different relationships between choice and wrongdoing
discussed above. Purpose requires that the forbidden
result be one's conscious object or that one is aware, or
hopes and believes, that a forbidden circumstance (e.g.,
that the property is stolen) exists.', Knowledge requires
11. Accord Moore, supra note 9, at 322.
12. Accord Finkelstein, supra note 10, at 337 ("[Ilt is doubtful that the
distinction between intending something as an end in itself and intending
something as a means to a further end is at all significant").
13. See also Moore, supra note 9, at 322.
14. Michael Moore offers two qualifications here: "Two variables within the
object of any belief determine the degree of its culpability: (1) the probability with
which the agent judged that his act would possess those attributes that would
make it prima facie wrongful; and (2) the probability with which the agent judged
that his act, although prima facie wrongful, would nonetheless possess other,
justifying attributes that would make it not wrongful, all things considered." Id.
at 325.
15. The Model Penal Code defines purpose as follows:
(a) Purposely. A person acts purposely with respect to a material element
of an offense when:
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that one be practically certain of the result of one's conduct
or that one is aware that such circumstances exist.
16
Recklessness entails the conscious disregard of the
substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result may
occur or that such circumstances exist." Negligence
requires that one is unreasonably unaware of the
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the forbidden result
may occur or that the circumstances exist.18 This hierarchy
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof,
it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause
such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of
the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes they exist.
Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Given the debate over whether mental states are properly applied to conduct
elements, see Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining
Criminal Liability: The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 681, 722
(1983), I will confine my analysis to circumstances and results. Accord Simons,
Rethinking, supra note 4, at 535 n.250 (I largely accept the analysis of Robinson
and Grall, who consider 'conduct' an inapposite object of mental states, and would
instead simply ask whether the conduct was voluntary .... That is, they reject
applying element analysis to basic bodily movements. I agree. If you voluntarily
broke into another's home, there seems little point to asking whether you
purposely, knowingly, or recklessly performed that action."); Alan C. Michaels,
Acceptance: The Missing Mental State, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 953, 1035 n.24 (1998)
(likewise agreeing with Robinson and Grall's analysis).
16. The Model Penal Code states:
(b) Knowingly. A person acts knowingly with respect to a material
element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or the attendant
circumstances, he is aware that his conduct is of that nature or that
such circumstances exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is aware that it is
practically certain that his conduct will cause such a result.
Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
17. Recklessness is defined as follows:
(c) Recklessly. A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element
of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering
the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the circumstances known
to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of
conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.
Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
18. The Code states:
2002] DON'T ABANDON THE MODEL PENAL CODE 191
presupposes that purpose is more culpable than knowledge;
knowledge more culpable than recklessness; and
recklessness more culpable than negligence.19
Hence, the traditional view of culpability, and the one
adopted by the Model Penal Code, is that culpability entails
choosing to commit a wrong. This definition has two
aspects. The first is the requirement of choice. We require
that the choice be made by someone who has the capacity
to understand the choice she is making and the ability to
control her actions. 0 When choice is impaired, we either
partially or fully excuse the actor.21
The second aspect of our culpability definition, and my
focus, is that the content of the choice determines the
degree of culpability. The more certain the actor is of the
result or the more the actor identifies with the result as an
end or a means to her ends, the more culpable we deem her
to be. Why does the content of the actor's choice matter for
assessing her culpability?
The actor's subjective assessment of possible
wrongdoing has direct bearing on retributive desert.
Purpose is more culpable than knowledge because purpose
entails aiming at the wrong, while knowledge entails
(d) Negligently. A person acts negligently with respect to a material
element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his
conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's
failure to perceive it, considering the nature and purpose of his conduct and
the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the
standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor's
situation.
Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(d) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
19. Recklessness is the default rule; negligence is generally disfavored in the
Model Penal Code. See Model Penal Code § 2.02(3) (Proposed Official Draft
1962).
20. See Michael S. Moore, Placing Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal
Law 548 (1997) ("[W]e are responsible for wrongs we freely choose to do, and not
responsible for wrongs we lacked the freedom (capacity and opportunity) to avoid
doing.").
21. See, e.g., Model Penal Code §§ 2.09 (duress), 210.3 (reducing murder to
manslaughter when the crime is committed under the influence of an extreme
mental or emotional disturbance) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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toleration of the known wrong.22 Hence, when A aims at a
wrong, her choice displays that this wrongdoing is part of
her identity, her projects, her goals. A knowing actor does
not so identify with the wrong, yet the choice the knowing
actor makes displays that she is willing to tolerate the
occurrence of a wrong.23 As for recklessness, the actor's
epistemic uncertainty means that the actor does not
identify with or choose the wrong, in the same manner as
knowing and purposeful actors.24  Hence, culpability
establishes the defendant's willingness to identify herself
with wrongdoing. The more the wrong is part of the actor's
reasons for acting, the more culpable she is and the more
she deserves to be punished.25
22. Accord Model Penal Code § 2.02 cmt. at 233 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
("It is meaningful to think of the actor's attitude as different if he is simply aware
that his conduct is of the required nature or that the prohibited result is
practically certain to follow from his conduct."). The Doctrine of Double Effect
turns on the purpose/knowledge distinction, and thus, the moral relevance of the
difference between the two mental states is often explored in that context. See,
e.g., Charles Fried, Right and Wrong 29 (1978) (footnote omitted) (purposeful
conduct renders the "harm a part of our projects"); Warren S. Quinn, Actions,
Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect, 18 Phil. & Pub. Aft.
334, 348 (1989) ("What seems specifically amiss in [instances of purposeful
conduct] is the particular way in which victims enter into an agent's strategic
thinking.").
23. The actor's knowledge that the harm will occur is part of the actor's choice
but it is not the part of the actor's intention. See Michael E. Bratman, Intention,
Plans, and Practical Reason 139-164 (Center for the Study of Language and
Information 1999) (1987).
24. Recklessness may involve purposeful risk-taking as well. This aspect of
recklessness is discussed infra note 25.
25. Jeremy Horder argues that criminal culpability is best described by the
combination of three theories: capacity theory, character theory, and agency
theory. Jeremy Horder, Criminal Culpability: The Possibility of a General
Theory, 12 Law & Phil. 193, 201-213 (1993). While I call my view that the
content of choice determines the degree of culpability "choice theory," Horder,
seemingly speaking about the same thing (with exceptions noted below), dubs this
"agency theory." See also Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note
4, at 370 n.14 (observing that Horder's agency theory seems to "overlap
significantly" with choice theory).
I disagree with Horder in two respects. First, he fails to distinguish
between purpose and knowledge. Both are seen by Horder to be intentional and
therefore the agent "hits the bulls-eye." Horder, supra, at 210 n.44. I fail to see
how a knowing harm, where the agent desires something very different, is
indistinguishable from a purposeful harm. In one instance, the agent will care
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While this framework is perspicuous, some unresolved
questions remain. The first is whether we should ever
punish for negligence. Culpability for negligence cannot be
predicated on the actor's choice to do wrong because the
actor makes no such choice. Rather, an alternative account
of culpability is required. At this point, choice theorists
either abandon liability for negligence or switch horses.26
The latter theorists offer a capacity theory at this point,
arguing that the capacity to do otherwise is sufficient for
culpability. But how can we justify the switch from one
inquiry to another?
27
The second question left unresolved is how to
understand two outliers to the general culpability scheme:
willful blindness and extreme indifference to human life.
In instances where the crime requires knowledge of an
attendant circumstance but the defendant avoids obtaining
that knowledge, courts, by legal fiction, have equated the
defendant's willful blindness with knowledge.
28  Willful
blindness is typically constructed as either knowledge of a
high probability without belief to the contrary (the Model
very little if the bulls-eye is hit; in the other, failure to hit the bulls-eye will be a
failure of his agency. Second, Horder's descriptive claim fails to take into account
the distinction between purposeful and knowing risk taking. To the extent that
an actor is aiming at creating a risk of harm to another, and this risk is created,
the actor's agency succeeds even if no harm occurs. For example, the "fun" in
Russian roulette is not the death of the playmate, but the risk being created.
26. See Peter Arenella, Character, Choice, and Moral Agency: The Relevance
of Character to Our Moral Culpability Judgments, 7 Soc. Phil. & Pol'y 59, 70
(1990) (discussing the split among choice theorists: the subjectivists who believe
conscious awareness to be required and the theorists who rely on H.L.A. Hart's
explanation that it is fair to blame negligent actors who had the capacity to act
reasonably).
27. This question presupposes that one theory can account for all our mental
states. For rejections of a single explanatory theory, see Horder, supra note 25;
R.A. Duff, Virtue, Vice, and Criminal Liability: Do We Want an Aristotelian
Criminal Law?, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 147 (2002).
28. The classic willful blindness example is the drug mule who is asked to
carry a suitcase across international borders, but who does not look in the
suitcase and fails to obtain "knowledge" that she is carrying a controlled
substance. In response to the defendant's willful blindness, courts equate this
recklessness with knowledge or carve out another mental state as an alternative
to knowledge.
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Penal Code's alternative definition of knowledge) 9 or
purposeful avoidance (the common law's approach that
functions in lieu of knowledge).3 0 But why do we seek to
equate these special instances of recklessness with
knowledge? We deem them to be of equal culpability, but
how and why?
Also raising questions is extreme indifference to
human life or "depraved heart" murder. In these cases, we
punish some homicides, those that entail "extreme
indifference," not as manslaughter but as murder.3
Extreme indifference jury instructions vary in focus from
the number of victims, to the totality of the circumstances,
to the degree of risk involved.2 Why are some instances of
recklessness more culpable than others?
Extreme indifference and willful blindness are striking
examples of failures in the Model Penal Code's hierarchy.
These instances of recklessness challenge the Model Penal
Code's implicit assumption that knowledge is more
culpable than recklessness. If recklessness can be of equal
or perhaps greater culpability than knowledge, we must
further inquire as to what constitutes culpability. Are we
overlooking some aspect of the actor's choice with this
simplistic hierarchy, or is culpability dependent upon more
than just the content of the actor's choice? Ken Simons
adopts the latter view, arguing that the actor's desires are
the missing link.
29. Model Penal Code § 2.02(7) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
30. See United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1976) ("[Willful
blindness] differs from positive knowledge only so far as necessary to encompass a
calculated effort to avoid sanctions of the statute while violating its substance.").
31. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 210.2(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
Russian roulette is a classic example of where the actor's sheer insensitivity to
the risk of harm created may warrant significant punishment.
32. See Michaels, supra note 15, at 1007-12 (discussing these approaches).
194
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II. KEN SIMONS'S CHALLENGE TO THE MODEL PENAL CODE
A. Simons's Rethinking
In Rethinking Mental States, Ken Simons argues that
the Model Penal Code fails to capture culpability because
the Model Penal Code's hierarchy of purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence is too simplistic. According to
Simons, the Code's hierarchy conceals the distinction
between culpable beliefs and culpable desires.3 By mixing
the desire state of purpose with the cognitive conceptions of
knowledge and recklessness, the Model Penal Code fails to
capture fully the constitutive parts of culpability.
In lieu of the Model Penal Code's approach, Simons
offers a different conception of culpability. Culpability is
defined not only by the cognitive states of the actor but also
by the desire states of the actor.3 4  The belief and desire
state hierarchies independently speak to culpability, and
comparisons can be made intra-hierarchy but not inter-
hierarchies. 5  Hence, an actor's culpability may vary
depending on the extent to which she believes an event is
certain,36 or alternatively, an actor's culpability may
depend upon the extent to which she desires that harm
occur.3 7  Importantly, within the latter desire-state, or
"conative," hierarchy, Simons introduces the concept of
"culpable indifference," the term of art Simons employs to
33. Simons, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 464.
34. Also, a third alternative exists where the actor does not have occurrent
belief or desire states, but her conduct deviates from the norm. This third
hierarchy has no bearing on criminal liability. See Simons, Culpability and
Retributive Theory, supra note 4, at 386.
35. Simons, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 476, 477 ("[B]eliefs are not
categorically more significant than desires, and desires are not categorically more
significant than beliefs.").
36. Beliefs can range from relative certainty of X, to substantial possibility of
X, to a belief of not X. Id. at 476.
37. There is also a desire hierarchy, ranging from desire for X; to no
preference about X; to desire that not X. Id. In his Appendix, Simons further
partitions the middle desire state into equivocal lack of preference about X, desire
to create risk of X, and callousness about X, in caring less than one should. Id. at
app. at 543.
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characterize those instances in which an actor cares less
than she should. 8
Why do we need to rethink mental states according to
Simons? While the Model Penal Code's approach "almost
works," it is "too simplistic." 39 In particular, cognitive
recklessness, adopted by the Model Penal Code, ignores
conduct (grossly deficient behavior) and conative (culpable
indifference) senses of recklessness. 4° The latter omission
is especially troubling to Simons because "[t]he modern
account of recklessness, emphasizing cognitive awareness
of risk, ignores or conceals the moral quality that 'culpable
indifference' expresses."41 The Model Penal Code also
ignores and hides other distinctions, failing, for example, to
distinguish purpose (a conative state) from knowledge (a
cognitive state).4  The Code survives, however, because
some crimes combine belief and desire components and
because it creates doctrinal exceptions in particularly
problematic areas (e.g., willful blindness and extreme
indifference to human life).
43
Simons believes that his emphasis on desire states has
significant explanatory power. For example, Simons claims
that culpable indifference underlies the culpability of
extreme indifference and willful blindness. Extreme
indifference is a conative state, incomparable to the
cognitive state of knowledge.44 Hence, the Model Penal
Code's hierarchy inaptly conceives of all knowledge cases as
more culpable than recklessness cases, while Simons
contends that indifference can be just as culpable as
knowledge is; they are simply in separate hierarchies.
Willful blindness is likewise resolved in this manner, as the
willfully blind actor displays indifference, even if she lacks
38. Id. at 478.
39. Id. at 468, 466.
40. Id. at 487.
41. Id. at 467.
42. Id. at 468, 473. Purpose is actually a hybrid, as Simons acknowledges.
The actor must desire X and believe that she is capable of achieving X. Id. at 477.
43. Id. at 468.
44. Id. at 486-90.
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cognitive knowledge.45 Thus, to Simons, our inability to
explain these two outliers is directly tied to the Model
Penal Code's failure to consider culpable desires in addition
to culpable beliefs.
Perhaps most significant is the approach Simons takes
to negligence. While in Rethinking Mental States, Simons
carves out his three hierarchies, culpable indifference is
given teeth in Culpability and Retributive Theory: The
Problem of Criminal Negligence. 6 Here, Simons addresses
the question of whether a negligent actor is culpable under
retributive theory. While some theorists vehemently argue
that punishment for negligence is not justified,47 Simons
splits the baby. He finds that negligence that is the
product of culpable indifference is sufficient for criminal
liability, while belief and conduct-type negligence typically
is not.48  To determine which negligence cases are
appropriately the subject of criminal responsibility, a
counterfactual inquiry must be undertaken-would the
actor have engaged in the conduct even if she knew that
she was risking injury?49 The negligent actor may justly be
held accountable when she is indifferent to others; that is,
in those instances in which she would have proceeded had
she been cognitively aware of the risk. Hence, Simons
claims that even in the absence of a culpable belief, an
actor should be held accountable when she has a culpable
desire.
Simons believes that culpability premised upon
conative states is consistent with retributivism.
"Retributive theory is and should be concerned with the
actor's antisocial attitudes expressed in his conduct. 5 °
45. Id. at 500-02.
46. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note 4.
47. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Reconsidering the Relationship Among
Voluntary Acts, Strict Liability, and Negligence in Criminal Law, 7 Soc. Phil. &
Pol'y 84 (1990); Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal
Liability, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 632 (1963).
48. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note 4, at 386.
49. Id. at 381. Simons's contribution to this Symposium places additional
demands on the counterfactual inquiry to be undertaken.
50. Id. at 388.
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Simons also views responsibility based on conative states
as consistent with choice: "culpable indifference could
express a choice-based retributivism, though in perhaps a
slightly weaker sense of 'choice."'51
Thus, Simons views the Model Penal Code as
confusing beliefs and desires. The Model Penal Code's
most crucial omission is its failure to include culpable
indifference because this mental state more fully captures
the moral failing of reckless actors. Moreover, culpable
indifference explains what the Model Penal Code cannot-
willful blindness and extreme indifference. Indeed, not
only does culpable indifference have a different emphasis
than the Model Penal Code's cognitive recklessness but also
it is broader as it includes those actors who are
unreasonably unaware of a risk because of their
indifference.
Why does the Model Penal Code eschew the
callousness of the reckless actor in favor of a more cognitive
approach? Is it not the desire to kill that makes purposeful
killings culpable? Why does the Model Penal Code lack any
mention of these evil desire states in favor of its largely
cognitive hierarchy?
As we shall see, Simons's culpability triumvirate is
unworkable. First, I shall demonstrate that while Simons
claims to adopt three culpability hierarchies, he, in fact,
adopts only one-the conative hierarchy. Moreover, I
contend that separate and distinct conative and cognitive
hierarchies cannot coexist within one culpability theory.
B. Simons's Underlying Culpability Theory
While Simons claims that there are three relevant
mental state hierarchies, and that comparisons cannot be
made inter-hierarchy, he implicitly makes such
comparisons and adopts a vision of culpability that includes
only conative states. In Simons's view, a belief that one
51. Id.
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will risk or cause harm is neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for culpability.
Consider Simons's argument about knowledge.
Simons contends that knowledge masks instances of
indifference, although not all cases of knowledge are
instances of indifference.5 2 Thus, in those cases where we
believe knowledge to be culpable, Simons contends that
these are cases where the belief requirement is serving as a
surrogate for the desire.53  If X blows up a prison wall
knowing Y is on the other side, it is X's indifference that
does the work, not X's belief.54 On the other hand, a drug
company that manufactures a socially valuable drug but
that is aware of the statistical probability that one of its
consumers will die, is not indifferent and according to
Simons, not culpable. 5   Thus, to Simons, "the 'knowing'
element of murder is... an error, albeit a largely harmless
one."51 The indifference determines the culpability, not the
defendant's belief. Hence, despite the fact that these
defendants "know" they will cause harm, this condition is
insufficient for culpability. Rather, according to Simons,
we must look to the defendant's conative state.
Beliefs, however, are not even necessary conditions for
culpability. Simons is willing to punish those negligent
actors who are unaware that they are risking harm, if they
would have continued had they perceived the risk. 7 Thus,
Simons is willing to punish these actors for their
indifference, despite the lack of any cognitive appreciation
of the risk being created.
Now, if beliefs are neither necessary nor sufficient
conditions for culpability, one must question whether they
do any work in Simons's analysis. He claims that beliefs
52. Cf. Michaels, supra note 15, at 963 (premising his argument on the
assertion that all cases of knowledge entail the same aspect of indifference).
53. Simons, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 492.
54. Id. at 492.
55. Id. at 492-93.
56. Id. at 493.
57. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note 4, at 388. For
further qualifications to this counterfactual inquiry, see Simons's contribution to
this Symposium.
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are more tractable; that the jury's inquiry is simpler; and
that beliefs often serve as surrogates for desires.55 These
are all pragmatic arguments. In no sense does Simons
adopt a view that belief states are themselves a
constitutive part of culpability.
Moreover, while Simons claims that inter-hierarchy
comparisons cannot be made, the thrust of his argument
makes these comparisons and implicitly favors conative
states. How can the drug manufacturer be compared to the
prison escapee? One has a culpable belief; the other has a
culpable desire. If inter-hierarchy comparisons cannot be
made, then the manufacturer's culpable belief cannot be
judged against the escapee's culpable desire. Indeed, given
that Simons contends that the drug manufacturer is not
culpable, one must question how he makes this
determination. For Simons, the common denominator for
culpability is the conative state.
Most importantly, it is difficult to conceive of both of
these separate hierarchies coexisting within one culpability
theory. Consider the following scenario offered by Simons.
In arguing that beliefs are not equivalent to desires
because one may hold the same belief but have different
feelings about the belief, Simons presents three alternative
scenarios with an actor running a red light.5 9 The first
permutation is that the actor is cognitively reckless in
running a red light and seeing pedestrians in the crosswalk
and is indifferent to pedestrians (cognitive recklessness
and culpable indifference). Second, the actor is likewise
cognitively reckless for running the light, but hopes not to
hit a crossing pedestrian, whom he notices is his friend
(cognitive recklessness and no indifference).60 The third
58. Id. at 390; Simons, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 493 n.288.
59. Simons, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 497.
60. This is Simons's assessment. I believe that if you choose to take the risk of
hitting your friend this is the only kind of indifference that the law should care
about, even if you hope to avoid injury. In e-mail correspondence, Simons relayed
that he now views this actor as evincing regret, which does not affect punishment.
This retraction does not, I believe, undermine the usefulness of employing this
particular example for explicative purposes. This example is also employed infra
text accompanying note 71 to illuminate the confusion within Simons's analysis.
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instance entails the actor being unaware of the pedestrian,
but indifferent to pedestrians nevertheless (negligence and
perhaps culpable indifference).
How do we rank these cases? This depends on our
theory of culpability. The first and third have what Simons
would deem to be culpable conative states, while the first
and second register on the cognitive culpability scheme.
While Simons says that we cannot compare beliefs to desire
states, how should a sentencing judge evaluate three
defendants each presenting one of these mental states?
Which cases are alike and which are different? One needs
a theory of why either mental state is relevant to
culpability, and then one should be able to make culpability
comparisons. Simons's isolated hierarchies do not amount
to a coherent account of culpability.
Indeed, part of the problem with Simons's culpability
hierarchy is that he fails to resolve the underlying
conceptual question of what makes an actor culpable in the
first instance. While, in Rethinking Mental States, he
argues that his approach is consistent with both deterrence
and retributivism, in Culpability and Retributive Theory,
he focuses on justifying culpable indifference within
retributive theory. But his conception of retributive theory
is unclear. He argues that culpable indifference is
consistent with a "weak" choice-based view, a character
view under Jeremy Horder's ideal agent theory, and
arguably a third counterfactual approach to culpability.61
To illustrate, in claiming that a choice-based
retributivist can punish even in the absence of cognitive
awareness, Simons turns to Michael Moore's claim that
"[wlhat makes the intentional or reckless actor so culpable is
not unexercised capacity.. .but the way such capacity to
avoid evil goes unexercised; such wrongdoers are not even
trying to get it right. 62 Likewise, Simons claims, culpably
indifferent actors are not even trying to get it right. This
61. As Simons has since indicated to me, he was intentionally agnostic as to
the best theory for retributive culpability. The problem is, however, that how we
rank these cases is inevitably dependent on the theory selected.
62. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note 4, at 389.
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failure of culpably indifferent actors to exercise their
capacity to get it right, because they are culpably indifferent,
is sufficient for retributive blame under a choice-based view
according to Simons." Hence, under this conception of
culpability, arguably the first and second actors exercise the
most choice and are therefore the most culpable.
Simultaneously, however, Simons claims that culpable
indifference may be better understood as part of Jeremy
Horder's character theory. Horder argues that our
culpability theory is in part explained by character theory.
Specifically, Horder claims that we deem individuals to be
culpable when they deviate from our conception of the
"ideal agent." Yet, Horder himself finds that this ideal
agent character theory cannot explain the distinction
between mental states and instead relegates character
theory to explaining "confession and avoidance" defenses,
such as duress.6 4  All three actors depart from our
conception of an "ideal agent," but who is least ideal?
Finally, to explain the distinctions between mental
states, Simons turns to a third counterfactual inquiry for
culpability. In discussing the rationale for distinguishing
advertent from inadvertent risk-taking, Simons suggests,
"[t]he assumption... is that an actor who is unaware of a
risk is less at fault than a consciously reckless actor
because we cannot be confident that the first actor would
have proceeded despite the risk if he had been aware of
it. )6 5  Simons makes the same claim for the
recklessness/knowledge distinction: "the reckless actor,
while he was willing to create a substantial risk of harm to
another, might not have been willing to cause a harm if he
believed that that result was a virtual certainty."66 Hence,
to Simons, our culpability hierarchy rests on a lack of
63. I take Moore's language to be infelicitous here, and inconsonant with his
general theory of culpability, which is clearly predicated on the content of choice
and not the degree of unexercised capacity. See generally Moore, supra note 9
(distinguishing degrees of culpability). However, Moore's argument is consistent
with choice-based responsibility as expressed infra Section III.B.3.
64. Horder, supra note 25, at 208-09.
65. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note 4, at 380.
66. Id. at 381.
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epistemic certainty that the actor would have proceeded
had the facts been otherwise. Simons, however, claims that
where we can prove the actor would have acted anyway
because of the actor's antisocial attitude, the distinctions
between mental states no longer hold. According to this
view, the second actor is least culpable because we are most
certain that he would not act if he knew he would hit his
friend.
In summary, Simons fails to ground his culpability
theory in a theory of culpability. His failure to define why
retributivism cares about character, choice, and/or our
epistemic limitations provides the reader with no ruler by
which to measure his theory. Hence, Simons flounders,
never clearly seeing that he cannot define culpability both
cognitively and conatively. Nevertheless, I believe Simons
is best understood as endorsing a theory of culpability
based on conative states. To him, beliefs are neither
necessary nor sufficient for culpability, nor do they seem to
be supported by the same rationale as conative states.
With Simons thus understood, we turn to the more
fundamental problem with Simons's approach: he confuses
different meanings of indifference. Indeed, it is only by
resting his argument on this fissure in meaning that he is
able to claim that his view is superior to the Model Penal
Code's. However, once we unpack the disparate claims
made under the indifference umbrella, we find that these
claims are either wholly objectionable or consistent with
the Model Penal Code.
III. THE MEANING OF INDIFFERENCE
Simons confuses different meanings of indifference.
This confusion masks four different claims that Simons is
making. Properly understood, two of Simons's claims are
morally objectionable. The other two are compatible with
the Model Penal Code's current approach to culpability.
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A. Two Conceptions of Indifference
Consider how Simons defines indifference. "The terms
'indifference,' 'not-caring,' and 'callousness' all describe a
culpable desire state-not a desire to harm, but an
insufficiently strong aversion to harm, or a desire or
willingness to create a risk of harm. '67 "Although 'reckless
indifference' can have many meanings, I use it here as a
term of art for any of the following: literal indifference
about whether or not something occurs; a desire to create a
risk; and 'callousness,' or caring less about a result or
circumstance than one should."6  Simons lists "three
different ways in which recklessness can be a mental state
of desire": equipoise; desire to create risk of harm; and
caring less than one should.69 Simons also states that
"'[c]aring less than one should' is not a single desire state.
Rather, it expresses what philosopher Holly Smith has
called 'a reprehensible configuration of desires and
aversions."'7 0
Now consider the following example. Danielle decides
to play Russian roulette with Andrew. Danielle does not
particularly care for Andrew, and is wholly equivocal as to
whether Andrew is killed. Danielle pulls the trigger, and
Andrew dies.
Contrast Darla who plays Russian roulette with Abe.
Darla is very fond of Abe; indeed, the two are dating. Yet,
Darla and Abe enjoy the rush that comes from playing
Russian roulette. Darla pulls the trigger, and Abe dies.
In the first example, Danielle can be said to be
indifferent in two different respects. First, her desire state
about Andrew is indifferent. She cares not whether he
lives or dies. Second, she may be said to be indifferent
because, although faced with the risk of death, she chooses
to pull the trigger.
67. Simons, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 466-67.
68. Id. at 477.
69. Id. at 486-87, app. at 543.
70. Id. at 487 n.86 (quoting Holly M. Smith, Culpable Ignorance, 92 Phil. Rev.
543, 556 (1983)).
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Darla, on the other hand, is indifferent only in the
latter sense. That is, Darla does care, indeed she cares
deeply, about Abe. She is not indifferent towards his death.
Nevertheless, we may still say that her choice, to play
Russian roulette, manifests indifference to human life.
The first meaning of indifference is a desire that the
actor has. A desire is a mental state. Like any mental
state, it takes an intentional object. That is, an actor must
desire (or be indifferent toward) something. The latter
sense is our normative evaluation of the actor's choice. We
do not care about how the actor feels when we label her
indifferent. Rather, no matter what she may wish, hope, or
desire, we may decide that she does not care enough. This
latter sense of indifference does not belong within a desire
state hierarchy, because it is not a subjective mental state
of the actor. It is our evaluation of the actor's choice.
Is Darla indifferent under Simons's theory? Note that
Simons's alternative definitions yield that Darla is and is
not indifferent. She certainly cares less than she should,
thus satisfying the normative definition of indifference.
Yet, she is not in equipoise. Rather, her desire is for Abe to
live.
Upon which sense of indifference does Simons intend
to rely? The answer is both. For example, at times,
Simons clearly cares about an agent's desires. Consider
Simons's driver who runs a red light, hoping not to hit his
friend in the crosswalk:
Belief that one will create a risk or cause a harm cannot be
equated with a culpable desire-state, however. Our driver
could be aware of the harm yet care very much, as in the
case where the pedestrian he sees is a friend. Or he could
be unaware yet indifferent.7'
Simons takes a similar approach to distinguish Jack from
Jill, two actors who are receiving stolen property:
71. Id. at 497 (footnotes omitted).
206 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:185
If Jill hopes, and does not merely believe, that the goods are
stolen, perhaps she hopes to be part of an ongoing stolen
goods ring, or perhaps she simply finds immoral satisfaction
in facilitating crime. In a second scenario, by contrast, if
Jack merely believes the goods are stolen, but actually
hopes that they are not, then he does not really want to
facilitate crime. He simply wants to take advantage of a
below-market price. Jill is arguably more blameworthy.72
Simons also claims that the strategic bomber who
knowingly kills may be less culpable because he "regrets
having to cause civilian casualties."73
In these examples, Simons looks to the defendants'
desires. The driver cares about whether the pedestrian is
killed; Jack hopes the goods are not stolen; the bomber
wishes he did not have to cause civilian casualties. All
three of these cases rely on the sense of indifference that
distinguishes Danielle from Darla: what was the
defendant's desire regarding the harm? All three of these
agents did not desire to cause the harm that was going to
occur. Thus, Simons may be interpreted as arguing that
the Model Penal Code truly ignores desire states.
Now consider a different example where Simons claims
there is indifference. "Someone blows up the wall of a
prison to help an inmate escape, knowing that she is very
likely to kill a guard, but not desiring to kill him.... Here,
the belief-state is a surrogate for the desire-state." 14 This
example privileges the normative sense of indifference.
Knowing actors are indifferent in the sense that they do
not care as much as they should about whether the harm
occurs. Here, Simons ignores the very factor that he gave
meaning to in the previous examples: whether the agent
hoped or desired that the harm occur.
Simons employs a confession and avoidance strategy to
deal with the multiplicity of meanings that he gives to
indifference. At one point he notes, "[t]hese dramatically
72. Id. at 500.
73. Id. at app. at 546-47.
74. Id. at 492.
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different conceptions of culpable indifference again
underscore the need for clear articulation of the culpable
indifference criterion if it is to be used more widely."
7 5
After recognizing that "caring less than one should" is not
really a desire state, Simons footnotes:
I qualify this assertion because the second and third senses
of reckless indifference are not, strictly speaking, within the
hierarchy. For example, an actor might be recklessly
indifferent in desiring to risk harm, or in not caring as
much as she should about whether she causes harm, yet she
might at the same time desire not to cause harm .... And
since these senses are not within the hierarchy, one cannot,
without further analysis, directly rank them in
seriousness.76
This confession is unsatisfactory. Simons claims that
his conceptual model, containing beliefs, desires, and
conduct, is preferable to the reigning hierarchy. Yet, most
of the time, Simons is not relying on indifference as a
desire state. Thus, to defend the Model Penal Code against
Simons's attack, one must recognize that Simons is not
presenting one coherent thesis. Rather, indifference plays
different roles for different arguments that Simons makes.
In the next section, I extract what I take to be four
separate claims that Simons is making under the
penumbra of indifference. I argue that once properly
understood, Simons's view may supplement and illuminate
the Model Penal Code, but he does not challenge it.
B. Four Claims Behind the Confusion
In this section, I unpack four claims that Simons
makes, each using indifference in a different manner. I
contend that the former two do not pose a challenge to the
Model Penal Code, as both are inconsistent with choice-
based responsibility, and therefore should be rejected
75. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note 4, at 397.
76. Simons, Rethinking, supra note 4, at app. at 543 n.271 (citation omitted).
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outright. I argue the latter two do not challenge the Model
Penal Code's hierarchy, but complement it.
1. Desire States Are Constitutive Parts of Culpability
Simons's suggested hierarchy views "culpable
indifference" as a desire state. That is, just as one might
desire ice cream; one may have feelings, emotions, and
desires about other people. Consider the premise of
Rethinking Mental States. Simons contends that the Model
Penal Code conceals the distinction between belief and
desire states.7  Hence, Simons constructs separate
hierarchies, with beliefs in one hierarchy and desires in
another.7 8  Indifference, he claims, is part of the desire
hierarchy. 9 Without debating the ontology of such states,
it should suffice to say that indifference, as a desire state,
is a mental state, akin to beliefs and intentions.
Hence, the clear thesis of Rethinking Mental States is
that the Model Penal Code is misguided in that it confuses
the distinction between beliefs and desires. This is not a
claim that the normative sense of indifference matters,
because the normative sense is wholly out of place in the
hierarchy. Rather, Simons states that we must pay
attention, not just to the agent's beliefs, but also to the
agent's desires.
This claim does not present a viable challenge to the
Model Penal Code. We should not view desires as
constitutive parts of culpability. The first problem is that
desires are vague.80 While Simons recognizes that reliance
on desire states is vague in the sense that it permits
significant factfinder discretion and fails to give actors
guidance as to what is forbidden by the law, the vagueness
77. Id. at 463.
78. Id. at 465.
79. Id. at 466-67.
80. Cf. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note 4, at 377.
Conversely, Simons criticizes belief states, asking what exactly the actor has to
believe and arguing that awareness is difficult to identify. Id. at 382, 384. For
my partial resolution of this problem, see Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Opaque
Recklessness, 91 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 597, 627-641 (2001).
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problem is not simply tied to pragmatism and legality
concerns.81  There is an epistemic problem-our feelings
and desires may be opaque to us. How does one premise
culpability on such an indiscernible state of mind?
Indeed, belief states are not just more tractable; they
are bounded by rationality. A rational agent cannot have
inconsistent beliefs: I cannot believe both that my pen is
red and that my pen is not red at the same time. To believe
so would be criticizably irrational. On the other hand,
desires need not be so reconciled. I can desire both to lose
weight and to eat a piece of chocolate cake. Desires
compete in ways that beliefs do not.82
If we are to rest culpability on desires, how should we
do this in those cases where the desires conflict? Are we
culpable simply for having one desire? Are we culpable
only if the stronger desire is the "bad" one? Arguably, it is
the desire that one acts upon that makes one culpable or
not. But why? Both desires are a part of me. Why does it
matter that one desire won the day? Here, the response
seems clear-because I chose to act on that desire. But
then, it seems that culpability is not dependent upon a
datable desire state but the choice that one makes.
Perhaps most problematic for resting culpability on
desires is the free will objection. As Heidi Hurd discusses
in her "liberal" objection to hate crimes, punishing for an
agent's dispositions and desires punishes her for something
she cannot control.84 Indeed, to alter our character, our
81. These concerns are more appropriately levied against the conception of
indifference discussed infra III.B.3.
82. Cf. Anthony M. Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical
Foundations of Bias Crime Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1015, 1066 (1997) (noting,
in the hate crime context, that motivations may conflict).
83. Accord Moore, supra note 9, at 322 (noting that desires inevitably conflict
and intentions are the "resolution of that conflict in the form of a decision").
84. Heidi M. Hurd, Why Liberals Should Hate "Hate Crime Legislation," 20
Law & Phil. 215, 229-32 (2001). Hate crimes raise the question of whether
motivations and desires can enhance culpability. Heidi Hurd and Anthony Dillof
contend that this enhanced culpability theory is incompatible with liberalism.
Id.; Dillof, supra note 82, at 1080. Hate crimes might be independently justified
as a different kind of wrong; however, Anthony Dillof has also unpacked this
rationale and found it to be lacking under either a "right not to be discriminated
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beliefs, our desires, we must go about it indirectly by, for
example, going to therapy.5  We cannot "will away" our
desires;88 we can only make the right decisions. Hence, to
punish for a factor in the agent's reasoning, rather than the
product of that reasoning, punishes the agent for
something beyond her control.
Of course, these examples point to problems with using
desires to enhance culpability, but if desires were a
constitutive part of culpability, they would also mitigate.
Is the hitman less culpable if he wishes that he could earn
an honest dollar? Is the Russian roulette player less
culpable because she cries when her companion dies? Of
course not. These desires are irrelevant because faced with
the choice, the actor chose to do wrong.
87
Hence, we should not view desires as constitutive parts
of culpability. They are vague, contradictory, and most
importantly, unchosen. Thus, the analytical framework of
Rethinking Mental States, which emphasizes desire states,
is not superior to the Model Penal Code's conception of
culpability.
against" theory (as this gives us a right to another's thoughts) or a secondary
wrong theory (if the legislation is targeted towards these secondary harms, such
as fear and unrest in the community, the use of the offender's motivations is a
crude proxy, which is over and under inclusive, and not empirically justified). See
id. at 1036-62; cf. Allison Marston Danner, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 389 (2002)
(defending her view that hate crimes are more wrongful and demanding, in Model
Penal Code-like fashion, that the actor be reckless with respect to this element).
85. Hurd, supra note 84, at 224-25.
86. Accord id. at 224-26 ("[It seems less clear to what degree people can will
away, or choose not to have, particular character traits, and specifically particular
emotions and belief."); Dillof, supra note 82, at 1066 ("[Olur beliefs and desires
are not a result of a direct act of will or free choice.").
87. There is one way in which desires are relevant to culpability: when the
desire to do wrong is the reason for action. Hence, if the hitman desires to hit the
victim, believes that by pulling the trigger he will do so, and then pulls the
trigger, the hitman has purposefully killed the victim. She chooses to commit a
wrong-her desire is her reason for acting, not simply a feeling toward the victim.
This view of how desires relate to choice is encompassed by the Model Penal
Code's definition of purpose.
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2. Free-Floating Indifference Is Relevant to
Culpability
Not only can Simons be understood as believing desires
to be a constitutive part of culpability, but also he may be
read as adopting a far broader character-based approach.
Consider Simons's negligence analysis. Simon has us
imagine Betty, who runs a red light, but fails to advert to a
pedestrian.88 He claims that Betty is culpably indifferent if
she satisfies a counterfactual inquiry: would she have run
the light even if she had seen the pedestrian?89
Here, we are not asking whether an actor showed
insufficient aversion to wrongdoing. After all, the actor
does not know she is endangering anyone! Rather, we are
to ask, if faced with the choice, whether the actor would
have proceeded. Thus, we look to how the agent feels about
her fellow man at the time she acts negligently.
This approach takes indifference as a desire state one
step beyond the previous inquiry. Before, we asked how
the agent felt about the harm that was about to occur.
Here, the agent does not advert to the harm, so she has no
attitude directed toward it. Rather, the only attitude she
has is toward her fellow man in general. That is, the
intentional object of her indifference, rather than being an
element of the crime, is all of mankind. Hence, we step
from one desire of the agent's to constructing that agent's
character. Is she an indifferent person? The indifferent
negligent actor, who because of her indifference fails to
notice the harm, is blamed for what her choice would have
been had she noticed the harm."
Such counterfactual inquiries are highly problematic.
Asking this counterfactual question does not amount to
punishing the actor for what she did, but for what she
would have done had the situation been different. Why not
88. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note 4, at 365.
89. Id. at 381.
90. Simons limits the reach of his counterfactual inquiry in his contribution to
this Symposium. An evaluation of whether these limitations meet my objection
will have to await another day.
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ask: had Mary not been born rich, would she have robbed
this bank? Had Tom been asked, would he have joined a
gang? Or, consider the converse: Had Julie known the
victim was her sister, would she have pulled the trigger?
We often look in hindsight with our "could've, would've,
should'ves," but are we going to place criminal
responsibility on the use of counterfactual inquiries? Are
we going to abandon any concept of free will and simply
predict what people would have done had the facts been
different? To rely on counterfactual inquiries effectively
punishes based on prediction and not choice.9 1
Thus, while Simons employs a far broader sense of
indifference to do the work for his negligence analysis, his
attempt at resolving the problem fails. The approach is
inconsistent with choice-based responsibility and amounts
to punishing for character.
3. Allusive Drafting Styles More Fully Capture
Culpability
In contrast to the desire-state approach, which focuses
on the actor's mental states-the things she wants, hopes,
91. Simons might attempt to refine his inquiry by drawing on the work of
Samuel Pillsbury. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Crimes of Indifference, 49 Rutgers L.
Rev. 105 (1996). Pillsbury argues that we may root this indifference in a prior
culpable choice, because we choose our perception priorities. Id. at 152. Thus,
when we do not pay attention because we are indifferent, we are not being
punished for what we would have done, but for what we did-choosing not to pay
attention because of our indifference to our fellow man. However, to the extent
that Pillsbury wishes to refine the inquiry by relying on our chosen perception
priorities, he must demonstrate not only that we made a choice of our perception
priorities, but we (in a morally meaningful sense) made a choice (in a morally
meaningful sense) of our perception priorities. First, the question is who is doing
the choosing of these perception priorities. Is it enough that our bodies do it, or
must we consciously consider what we are paying attention to? Certainly, we are
not responsible for our heartbeats or reflexes; rather, we require consciousness-
it is the central aspect of moral responsibility. Are we consciously doing the
choosing? Next, is this a morally meaningful choice? Is it a choice that
demonstrates an understanding of the consequences? If/when we choose our
perception priorities, are we making a culpable choice vis-A-vis the eventual
result that obtains?
For further elaboration of my objections to Pillsbury's approach, see Ferzan,
supra note 80, at 639-641.
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and desires-Simons also views indifference as not caring
sufficiently about the harm that is about to occur. This is
not a claim that the agent is to be blamed for her desires,
but a claim that the agent's choice to do wrong reveals that
she has failed to give moral prohibitions sufficient respect.
Thus, an agent who knows that her action will result in
death may strongly desire that the death not occur, but
still, her choice manifests a willingness to accept the
consequences of her act.
Let us explore this sense of indifference in a bit more
detail. Traditional analysis of rational action presupposes
that action is the product of a practical syllogism where the
actor's major premise is her goal, motive, desire, and the
minor premise is the actor's belief that engaging in action
will further the major premise. 2 For example, if I go to the
Ben and Jerry's, this is the result of (1) my desire ice cream
and (2) my belief that if I go to Ben & Jerry's down the
street someone will sell me some. My action, going to the
store, is both caused and rationalized by my beliefs and
desires. 'While this model accounts for rational action, it
does not fully account for culpability. For example, the
actor who receives stolen property will not (in most cases)
desire that the property be stolen-it will not be a part of
her major or minor premise.
What accounts for the culpability of the knowing actor?
Simons, in discussing the crime of receiving stolen
property, claims that indifference is manifested because the
agent's belief that the property is stolen should have
counted as a reason against acting but did not. 4 Is it the
belief that the property is stolen that does the work? Or
92. See Michael S. Moore, Law and Psychiatry: Rethinking the Relationship
10 (1984). As Michael Moore explains, our reasons for action are the result of the
following practical syllogism:
(1) The major premise: "the agent's desires (goals, objectives, moral beliefs,
purposes, aims, wants, etc.)"
(2) the minor premise: the agent's "factual beliefs about the situation he is
in and his ability to achieve, through some particular action, the object
of his desires."
93. Id.
94. Simons, Culpability and Retributive Theory, supra note 4, at 392-93.
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should an actor have an aversion to committing a wrong?
Here, indifference comes into play in a different manner. If
I desire a watch and believe it to be stolen, then I should
not take the watch because morality demands that I not
possess property taken from its rightful owner. Indeed, all
cases of knowledge are cases where committing the wrong
is not motivational but where knowledge that the wrong
will occur should repel. It is this sense of indifference that
Simons taps into when he claims that "the 'knowing'
element of murder is... an error" because the belief
requirement is serving as a surrogate for the desire. 5
Hence, when the prison escapee blows up the prison wall,
knowing he will kill the guard on the other side, the
willingness to accept the wrong is the indifference at work.
Indifference as insufficient moral aversion is
consistent with the Model Penal Code's scheme set forth in
Section I. This approach to indifference focuses on the
actor's choice. While it fails to account for purposeful (and
arguably some reckless) action where the wrongdoing is the
reason for action, the approach encompasses those
instances where the actor's choice entails tolerating a
wrong. We expect actors to be dissuaded from conduct that
is morally wrongful.
Why does the Model Penal Code call this "knowledge"?
Whether one dubs this mental state "indifference" or
"knowledge" is really a question about how to draft mens
rea. Consider what Samuel Pillsbury dubs "allusive" and
"analytic" drafting styles. 6 While the former "alludes to
the central wrong by moralistic description rather than by
defining the particular features of the choice or conduct
involved," the latter "defines wrongdoing by describing
particular aspects of harm doing, such as the actor's goal or
state of mind, usually without explicit moral language."97
Hence, to commit a crime knowingly (analytic) shows that
95. Simons, Rethinking, supra note 4, at 492-93.
96. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Judging Evil: Rethinking the Law of Murder and
Manslaughter 84 (1998).
97. Id.
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this person has insufficient aversion to moral wrongdoing
(allusive). 8
As we now see, knowledge and indifference are two
sides of the same coin: it is not that they are both discrete
mental states, but that one is an analytic style of mens rea
drafting and the other focuses on the central moral wrong.
Hence, while Simons may decide the allusive drafting style
is preferable to the analytical style, this determination does
not threaten the Model Penal Code's underlying conception
of culpability.
4. Attitudes Toward Wrongdoing May Be Relevant to
Culpability
There is one final way to understand Simons's thesis
about indifference. It relies on the actor's subjective
attitudes toward wrongdoing, without relying on the actor's
desires or feelings about the wrong. This is the sense of
indifference employed by Alan Michaels when he defines
"acceptance."
Let us consider Alan Michaels's thesis.9 9  Alan
Michaels claims that when we face practical certainty, we
not only afford the reason insufficient weight, we accept the
result.'00 We psychologically resign ourselves to the harm's
occurrence. Michaels then argues that we can resolve
extreme indifference and willful blindness by recognizing
that some of these cases likewise manifest acceptance. 10
The actor may have the same resignation that wrong will
occur, despite her epistemic uncertainty. When she is
98. Looking at these two drafting styles highlights Simons's confusion.
Rethinking Mental States purports to be about analytical drafting styles. Indeed,
not only does Simons "aimE to define wrongdoing into component parts," id., but
also Simons claims that we do not currently have enough parts! Simons's stated
philosophy is not that we need general attitude language to better capture the
essence and expression of culpability, but that we must delve deeper into the
mechanics of choice and focus on the separate belief and desire components.
99. I use Alan Michaels's work here because it is a fully developed account of
this view of indifference. Moreover, in his contribution to this Symposium,
Simons builds on Michaels's thesis.
100. Michaels, supra note 15, at 955.
101. Id. at 977-1019.
216 BUFFALO CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6:185
equally willing to tolerate a wrong, whether certain or just
likely, 10 2 why, asks Michaels, should we deem her to be of
lesser culpability?0 3 If the actor is determined to commit-
the crime willy-nilly, why should she "luck out" and only be
reckless, just because she is uncertain the harm will
occur?
04
This sense of indifference focuses on the defendant's
attitudes toward wrongdoing. In this way, it is compatible
with the Model Penal Code. The defendant may want the
harm (purpose) or she may be willing to tolerate the harm
(knowledge) or the risk of harm (recklessness). Rather than
focusing on our judgment of the actor's attitude--that it
102. To make this determination, Michaels asks whether the defendant
counterfactually accepted the harm. This inquiry is not a prediction of what the
actor would have done, but a method for determining the actor's degree of
indifference to a harm that she knows she is risking.
103. Michaels, supra note 15, at 967-70.
104. I think that Michaels does an admirable job of capturing the culpability of
a knowing actor. He may very well be correct in arguing that those who have
psychologically resigned themselves to potential harms are as culpable as those
who face certainty. My concern, however, is that Michaels's approach does not
have greater explanatory power in resolving willful blindness and extreme
indifference than does the Model Penal Code. Regarding willful blindness,
Michaels ignores those cases where an actor would not act had she known, but
does everything in her power not to know. Imagine Alex who is given a suitcase
to carry into the country. Alex, aware of the criminal law, recognizes that if he
looks in the suitcase and he sees drugs, he will be guilty of a drug crime, and
decides that it is in his best interest not to know. That being said, Alex hopes
that the suitcase does not contain drugs, and if the suitcase were to fall open, and
he were to see drugs, he knows he would not have the strength to go forward with
the crime. Indeed, Alex is so afraid to learn what is in the suitcase that he tapes
the suitcase together so it will not fall open. I submit Alex is willfully blind, but
cannot be said to have accepted that he is carrying drugs. Michaels does
acknowledge the possibility of Alex's existence but denies that such an actor is
willfully blind. Michaels, supra note 15, at 998.
Michaels's resolution of extreme indifference is also off-the-mark. First, the
Model Penal Code's formulation, and the work of criminal law scholars, largely
ignore that recklessness is actually purposeful and knowing risk creation. But see
John Gardner and Heike Jung, Making Sense of Mens Rea: Antony Duffs Account,
11 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 559, 587 (1991). While Michaels contends that extreme
indifference fills a gap between recklessness and knowledge, he fails to see that in
many cases, it fills a gap between purpose and recklessness. That is, the culpability
of the Russian roulette player is not his acceptance of the consequences of his
actions but rather that his end is itself evil-risking others unjustifiably.
In both of these cases, purposeful action is sometimes involved, and a
satisfactory model must account for these cases.
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manifests indifference-this use of indifference focuses on,
and describes, the actor's attitude toward the wrong. Still,
this attitude is distinguishable from a desire. The knowing
agent may accept a wrong that she desires not to occur.
10 5
This approach is also consistent with the Model Penal
Code.1"6 An actor who knows a harm will occur (Model Penal
Code) accepts the result (Michaels) and exhibits indifference.
While each inquiry focuses on a different aspect of the choice,
or a different way to define mens rea, all three view
culpability as the defendant's choice to do wrong. Hence, this
final interpretation does not challenge the underpinnings of
the Model Penal Code's conception of culpability.
In conclusion, Simons's usage of the term, "indifference,"
masks different senses that do different work. Once his
claims come to light, it is apparent that two of his claims
should be rejected. The additional two claims Simons makes
are compatible with the Model Penal Code's and do not
challenge the Code's linkage of wrongdoing and culpability.
CONCLUSION
The Model Penal Code links culpability to the actor's
assessment of wrongdoing. Ken Simons has challenged
this view, arguing that the Model Penal Code's culpability
hierarchy is "seriously inadequate" and should be replaced
with hierarchies of belief, desire, and conduct. However,
belief states do no work for Simons. Rather, he only cares
about what he believes to be the desire-state hierarchy.
Yet, once one scratches beneath the surface, one realizes
that his centerpiece of the desire-state hierarchy,
indifference, does not exist within the desire-state
hierarchy at all. Indeed, Simons confuses different
meanings of indifference. Underlying this confusion is four
different claims, two of which are inconsistent with choice-
based responsibility and two of which complement the
Model Penal Code's scheme.
105. See Michaels, supra note 15, at 962.
106. This leaves open the question of the best drafting style for mens rea, but
resolves the question of what makes an actor culpable.

